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Harris and Dunbaugh: Premise for a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Imprisonment

PREMISE FOR A SENSIBLE SENTENCING
DEBATE: GIVING UP IMPRISONMENT
M. Kay Harris*and Frank M. Dunbaugh**
Criminal sentencing practices and the theories on which they
are based are the subjects of unprecedented reexamination and debate. Proposals for revising criminal codes and sentencing statutes
are receiving lively attention in legislative chambers, judicial conferences, and public forums. This upsurge in interest in how and
why society should respond to criminal acts is heartening in many
respects. Concern and scrutiny have extended to public forums beyond the narrow circle of philosophers, prisoners, and professors
who always have pondered these matters. That concepts such as
equity, fairness, common sense, and "doing justice" often rise
above the din augurs well.
But there is a disturbing prospect that the most vital issues are
being overlooked or avoided amidst the discussion of procedures
and processes, theories and terms. Far too little serious consideration is being given to the true nature and uses of imprisonment. In
our view, imprisonment as now practiced is too violent and degrading to be imposed by a civilized society. While some forms of restraint may be necessary, we do not believe that our prison practices can be reformed sufficiently to justify their continuance. We
are equally skeptical about the prospects of redressing the current
dramatic imbalances with respect to who is incarcerated; it is
* Director, Washington Office of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. B.A., 1969, University of Kansas; A.M., 1971, University of Chicago. Ms.
Harris formerly was with the American Bar Association's Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services, the National Moratorium on Prison Construction, and
the United States Department of Justice. She also served as an Assistant Director of
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
The views set forth in this Article are those of the author and are not necessarily
endorsed by her employer.
** Coordinator, Maryland Alliance for Prison Alternatives; Staff member, Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary. B.B.A., 1955, University of Miami; LL.B., 1957, University of Miami. Member of the District of Columbia
and United States Supreme Court bars. Mr. Dunbaugh formerly was with the Civil
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice.
The views set forth in this Article are those of the author and are not necessarily
endorsed by his employer.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

1

Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979], [Vol.
Art. 87:
HOFSTRA
REVIEW

417

unacceptable to retain a harsh system which is applied disproportionately to the poor and minorities.
To most who have experienced them, even just for a visit,
America's prisons seem anachronistic, a vestige of some darker,
less civilized time. Yet there is a strange reluctance to entertain
their abolition; most of the current sentencing debate presupposes
heavy reliance on prison confinement. This Article is designed to
challenge continued use of the human cage.
We do not believe that abolishing prisons would yield the unfortunate consequences that some foresee. Prisons do not serve the
purposes said to require them. There are better responses to crime
and social conflict-responses which can help repair the harmful effects of crime and restore social harmony. The focus of the
sentencing debate should be shifted to the variety of critical issues
surrounding full implementation of alternatives to human confinement.
THE NATURE OF IMPRISONMENT:

"SLOW TORTURES... AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC VIEW"1

In 1847, seventy-two soldiers who deserted from the United
States Army and fought for Mexico during the Mexican-American
War were tried for desertion. After all appeals, fifty were sentenced to be executed and fifteen to be lashed and branded. As for
the latter:
Lashing and branding was no mild form of retribution, according
to descriptions. There were 50 lashes per man, and they were
laid on with rawhide whips by brawny Mexican muleteers. The
backs of those lashed "had the appearance of a pounded piece of
raw beef, the blood oozing from every stripe as given." The
brand was a capital "D" two inches high burned into the cheekbone with a red-hot iron.
Those sentenced to this punishment were also required to
dig the graves of the men who were hanged .... 2

Today, most people would react with outrage and disgust to
the imposition of such physical abuse. Modern America has
reached a point at which "[plunitive mutilation has become
unacceptable even as retaliation for irreversible bodily injury. In1. K. Menninger, Book Review 1 (1977) (unpublished review of A. VON
HIRscH, DOING JUSTICE (1976)) (Information File, Library of National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Hackensack, New Jersey) [hereinafter cited as Menninger].
2. Baker, The St. Patricks Fought for their Skins, and Mexico, SMITHSONIAN,
Mar. 1978, at 94, 99.
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deed, we have become repelled altogether by any form of corporal
punishment."3 Professing humanitarian purposes, imprisonment
has been substituted for whipping, mutilation, branding, impaling,
and disemboweling. But is imprisonment really so different from or
superior to the tortures of the past? Are the pain and suffering,
degradation, and humiliation occasioned by flogging and branding
truly more onerous than that resulting from an average prison
term? How many days in a cage does it take to achieve a quantum
of misery comparable to that suffered during the whipping and
branding of the deserters?
Dr. Karl Menninger has noted:
Mere imprisonment sounds relatively benign, but the realities of
jailing are almost as cruel, harsh and inhuman as the older
forms.
.. Stocks, whipping posts, dunking and face branding
were cruel, but they were honest. Jerking out tongues and tearing off ears had the merit of shorter pain duration than do our
present cruelties. Our forefathers' inventions were replaced by
4
the slow tortures of imprisonment-away from the public view.
In recent years, these "slow tortures" have been exposed by
an ever growing list of lawsuits in which courts have determined,
after extensive evidentiary hearings, that prisoners are being subjected to gross violations of their constitutional rights. 5 The theoretical basis underlying many of these cases is that the "totality of
conditions" within the prison or prison system is so inhumane that
6
confinement therein constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
7
forbidden by the eighth amendment to the Constitution:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than [huma Ldignity]. While the State has the power to
3.

E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CIUMINALS 199 (1975). Van den Haag, how-

ever, supports the ultimate in corporal punishrent-the death penalty.
4. Menninger, supra note 1, at 1, 8 (emphasis in original).
5. See Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishments: Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal Institutions, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1111 (1972); Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 803 (1977); Comment, Confronting the Conditions of
Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
RFv. 367 (1977).
6. See generally Comment, supra note 5.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment prohibitions are applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1972).
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punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
By the end of 1978, conditions of confinement had been found
to be illegal in the prisons of more than one-third of the states.9
Cases pending in eight other states also involve allegations of unlawful prison conditions."0
The evidence presented in these cases exposes the shocking
conditions that exist within America's penal institutions. Prisons are
8. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
9. Alabama: Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144
(1978); Arkansas: Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d
740 (8th Cir. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); California: Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Delaware: Anderson
v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977); Florida: Costello v. Wainwright, 397
F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), vacated on rehearing,
539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 325 (1977); Louisiana: Williams v.
Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); Maryland: Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp.
648 (D. Md. 1978); Massachusetts: M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F.
Supp. 398 (D. Mass. 1978); Mississippi: Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D.
Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Missouri: Burks v. Walsh, No.
75-CV-149C (W.D. Mo. Nov. 3, 1978); Nevada: Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656 (D.
Nev. 1975); New Hampshire: Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977);
New York: Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1977); Ohio: Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Jones v.
Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Oklahoma: Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.
Okla. 1974), affd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); Rhode Island: Jefferson v.
Southworth, 447 F. Supp. 179 (D.R.I. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956
(D.R.I. 1977); Tennessee: Trigg v. Blanton, No. A-6047 (Ch. Davidson County Aug.
23, 1978); Virginia: Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). Furthermore, illegal conditions have been found in many jails and facilities in the District of
Columbia, see Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1975), the Virgin
Islands, see Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.VI. 1976), Puerto Rico,
see Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976), affd, 537 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1976), and facilities operated by the federal government, see United States
v. Levi, 428 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4507 (U.S.
May 14, 1979) (No. 77-1829).
10. Harris v. Cardwell, No. 75-185-PHX (CAM) (D. Ariz., filed Mar. 26, 1975);
Ramos v. Lamm, No. 77-K-1093 (D. Colo., filed Nov. 30, 1977); Guthrie v. Evans,
No. 3068 (S.D. Ga., ree'd on transfer Feb. 5, 1973); French v. Owens, No. 75-677-C
(S.D. Ind., filed Nov. 21, 1975); Kendrick v. Carroll, No. C-76-0079-P (J) (W.D. Ky.,
filed Sept. 8, 1976); Duran v. Apodoca, No. 77-721-C (D. N. Mex., filed Nov. 15,
1977); Ruiz v. Estelle, No. H-78-987 (E.D. Tex., rec'd on transfer June 1, 1978);
Nielson v. Matheson, No. 76-253 (C.D. Utah, filed Aug. 6, 1976).
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unsanitary"

and unsafe.'

2

Many institutions regularly are over-

11. Extremely unsanitary conditions are common. For example, a federal district court in Mississippi found:
The housing units at [the State Penitentiary at Parchman] are unfit for
human habitation under any modern concept of decency. The facilities at all
camps for the disposal of human and other waste are shockingly inadequate
and present an immediate health hazard. Open sewage is a breeding ground
for rats and other vermin ....
The entire waste disposal system has been
condemned by state health and pollution agencies ....
Water, contaminated
as a result of the inadequate sewerage system, has caused the spread of infectious diseases.
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1974). The federal district court in Rhode Island noted:
The entire [Maximum Security Building of the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution] is massively infested with cockroaches, rodents, mice, and
rats, each of which carries disease throughout the prison. There are cats living in Maximum, and cat feces were observed on the floors of living areas
and the showers....
Plumbing throughout Maximum is unsanitary, inadequate, and an imminent danger to public health. . . . Pipes are not equipped with vacuum
breakers, creating an ever-present danger that waste water will back up into
the fresh water system, even in the food preparation area....
In the lavatories, the Court observed large pools of standing water on
the floor, and apparently this is always present. There was a stench of urine
coming from this water. The shower areas were filthy, covered with mold
and mildew on the floors and the walls. Glass, trash, and dead cockroaches
are everywhere on the shower floors.
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 961 (D.R.I. 1977). In New Hampshire, a
federal district judge declared:
The kitchen area [of the prison] is infested with rodents, cockroaches
and other insects ....
Due to the lack of ventilation, volatized grease from
the stove spreads throughout the kitchen, accumulating with dirt and thus
aggravating the basic hygiene problem in the food service area.
The butcher shop is unsanitary. . . . [It] is not properly cleaned, and
pieces of unused meat and fat accumulate under the butcher table.
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 278 (D.N.H. 1977). A federal judge in
Alabama reported:
One expert witness, a United States public health officer, toured facilities
at Draper, Fountain, Holman, and Kilby. He testified at trial that he found
these facilities wholly unfit for human habitation according to virtually every
criterion used for evaluation by public health inspectors. With very few exceptions, his testimony was that, if such facilities were under his jurisdiction, he would recommend that they be closed and condemned as an imminent danger to the health of the individuals exposed to them.
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (M.D. Ala. 1976), a.frd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978).
12. Examples of hazardous conditions in state prisons are numerous:
In parts of the building, the roof leaks rainwater, and tiles were falling off
the ceiling onto the floor.
...
Because [the] service areas house the electrical wiring, the leaking
pipes present a serious risk of electrical fire....
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crowded, substantially increasing the dangers of prison life. Overcrowding breeds epidemics, strains medical and psychiatric services, and increases emotional tension, hostility, and aggressive behavior, leading to more frequent outbreaks of violence. 13 Low
...Not infrequently, inmates burn themselves on the hot water pipes
which rise uncovered in the showers.
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 961 (D.R.I. 1977).
The electric wiring at a majority of the units is frayed, exposed and generally in a bad state of repair, presenting safety hazards to the inmates. Heating facilities are inadequate to heat the inhabited areas; many broken
windows at the camps are stuffed with rags to keep out the cold, wind and
rain ....
At most camps there is also a lack of adequate fire-fighting equipment at the housing units, making it, as stated by Mr. Cook [the penitentiary
superintendent], "almost impossible to put out a fire at Parchman with the
present water system and the present fire-fighting equipment."
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887-88 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d 1291
(5th Cir. 1974).
13. See, e.g., Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd,
525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976):
[Overcrowding] has a tremendous impact medically and emotionally.
Medically, it's conducive to spreading of epidemic-type diseases. It's
conducive to diseases in which there's a breakdown of resistance, such as,
for example, TB and the incidence of infection is-where people are really
in close proximity to each other, is much greater. And finally, the-emotionally, it produces a lot of depression, frustration, activates violence, promotes
aggression. When you're in an institution that's overcrowded, you can begin
to feel the tension, you can almost cut it with a knife.
Id. at 28 (quoting expert testimony of federal prison medical officer). The district
court, quoting from the Florida Comprehensive Plan for the Criminal Justice System,
further affirmed that
[the environment created by gross overcrowding induces a variety of dangerous conditions. Loss of control increases proportionately with population
increase thus producing greater threat to the orderly management of the institutions and the surrounding communities. This condition promotes anonymity and emotional stress, It depersonalizes both the guarded and the
guards. Treatment becomes less personal, less flexible, less effective.
Crowding people produces a pathology that gives [rise] to increased sexual
perversions, emotional instability, social disruption, and extreme depression.
Id. at 31. See also Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977), where the
court concluded that
[tjhe overcrowded living conditions directly affect the psychological wellbeing of the inmates. Cramped and suffocating quarters increase tension,
hostility and aggression, and exacerbate any personal problems an inmate
may have, thereby intensifying his anxiety and fear. Adequate control and
supervision of the living areas by the correctional staff is impossible, privacy
is non-existent and the noise levels are intolerable. An inmate cannot move
without getting in another inmate's way. Constant stress, increased tension,
and utter frustration generate conflicts and senseless violence over petty
matters. Civilized human discourse among inmates and staff is suppressed.
Even the time during which a prisoner can see visitors has been cut in half.
The cumulative psychological impact of these conditions on the individual
prisoner is extremely negative.
Id. at 1112 (footnote omitted).
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staff-to-prisoner ratios, exacerbated by crowding, make it difficult if

not impossible for staff to protect prisoners.'

4

One of the greatest horrors of being a prisoner is fear. Court
findings demonstrate the conditions that make fear a constant reality of prison life. 1 5 In Alabama, for example, a mentally retarded
20-year-old prisoner
testified that he was raped by a group of inmates on the first
night he spent in an Alabama prison. On the second night he
was almost strangled by two other inmates who decided instead
that they could use him to make a profit, selling his body to
other inmates. 16

Dangers are particularly acute in multibed sleeping areas. Until a federal court intervened, guards at the Cummins Farm unit in
Arkansas remained outside the barracks at night; inmate "floorwalkers" were supposed to report disturbances. According to the court:
At times, deadly feuds arise between particular inmates,
and if one of them can catch his enemy asleep it is easy to crawl
over and stab him. Inmates who commit such assaults are known
as "crawlers" and "creepers," and other inmates live in fear of
them. The Court finds that the "floorwalkers" are ineffective in
preventing such assaults; they are either afraid to call the guards
or, in instances, may be in league with the assailants.
The undisputed evidence is to the effect that within the last
18 months there have been 17 stabbings at Cummins, all but
one of them taking place in the barracks, and four of them
producing fatal results....
The Court is of the view that if the State of Arkansas
chooses to confine penitentiary inmates in barracks with other
inmates, they ought at least to be able to fall asleep at night
without fear of having their throats cut before morning, and that
the State has failed to discharge a constitutional duty in failing to
17
take steps to enable them to do so.

14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (D. Del. 1977);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v.

Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978).
15. For example, the court in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala.
1976), affd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978), observed that "[tihe evidence reflects that most prisoners carry some form of homemade or contraband weapon, which they consider to
be necessary for self-protection." Id. at 325.
16. Id.
17. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (E.D. Ark. 1969). The court noted

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

7

LAW
REVIEW
HOFSTRA
Hofstra
Law
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979], [Vol,
Art. 87: 417

A psychiatrist for the Florida Division of Corrections supplied
the court in Costello v. Wainwright'8 with his views concerning
factors contributing to prisoner fear in that state's prisons:
There are too many people in too small an area and too tense an
atmosphere, the tenseness added to by many of them being the
first time in a prison system. They're tense anyway and you add
to this the fact of crowding, the fact of fear, the fact of having to
wait for food and having to sleep in places for one where there
are three or four, the whole thing builds up this personal fear, of
panic, of homosexuality, of being hurt physically, of being subject to conversations which they would not be subject to if they
were more spread apart, by being subject to--with all due
respects-to great racial tension. Some people have never been
mixed with others of ethnic-different ethnic colors before and
they just don't-they just cannot tolerate it as an individual being closed up with three or four others of different pigmented
skin color and different outlooks and all this adds to it. The great
numbers that are concentrated there on a 19 year old boy the
first time away from home, you know we have lots of 19 year old
boys. 19
Living in constant fear in an unsafe, unsanitary environment
with little or nothing constructive to do sharply increases the difficulties in satisfactorily rejoining society upon release. 2 0 This point
has been articulated by many judges deciding cases concerning
prison conditions. A federal judge in Alabama noted:
The evidence in these cases also establishes that prison conditions are so debilitating that they necessarily deprive inmates
of any opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, or even to maintain skills already possessed. While courts have thus far declined
to elevate a positive rehabilitation program to the level of a constitutional right, it is clear that a penal system cannot be operated in such a manner that it impedes an inmate's ability to atthat assaults and killings do occur, even in prisons in which an effort is made to protect the inmates, but that "[alt Cummins there are no precautions worthy of the
name, and the 'creepers' and 'crawlers' take deadly advantage of that fact." Id. at
831.
18. 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 324-25.
20. Several courts have commented on the debilitative effects of idleness,
pointing out that overcrowding tends to further decrease the availability of program
activities. See, e.g., Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 317 (D.N.H. 1977);
Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318, 326 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub noma. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978).
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tempt rehabilitation, or simply to avoid physical, mental or social
21
deterioration.
The court in Costello made similar observations:
This Court, in the three years that these cases have progressed, has come to the growing realization, through expert testimony and documentary evidence that severe crisis overcrowding creates violence, brutality, disease, bitterness, and
resentment as to both inmates and correctional staff. In addition,
severe overcrowding in the prison system tends to perpetuate
antisocial behavior and foster recidivism so as to ultimately disserve the rehabilitative goals of the correctional system. A free
democratic society cannot cage inmates like animals in a zoo or
stack them like chattels in a warehouse and expect them to
emerge as decent, law abiding, contributing members of the
22
community. In the end, society becomes the loser.
A federal judge in New Hampshire asserted:
Where the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration
threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and wellbeing of the inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism
and future incarceration, a federal court must conclude that imprisonment under such conditions does violence to our societal
notions of the intrinsic worth and dignity of human beings and,
therefore, contravenes the Eighth Amendment's proscription
2
against cruel and unusual punishment. a
When prisoners'-rights litigation intensified about a decade
ago, it was generally believed that there were only a few "hell
holes" which could be made constitutionally permissible by applying a concerted effort. This outlook has changed dramatically as
evidence has accumulated regarding how widespread and intractable the problems of'prisons are. Seriously attempting to remedy
prison conditions would require far more resources than governmental bodies have thus far been inclined to allocate to corrections. 2 4 Efforts to rehabilitate institutions seem especially futile;
21. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144
(1978).
22. 397 F. Supp. at 38 (footnote omitted).
23. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977).
24. Some notion of the expenditures required to attempt a significant improvement of correctional facilities can be obtained from estimates of the costs of complying with judicial decrees aimed at remedying illegal prison conditions. The
Budget Bureau in Baltimore, Maryland, estimated that implementation of the court
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even many relatively new facilities are obsolete. 25 Moreover, to the
decrees entered in Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972), cost
about $1.5 million in the first year. M.K. Harris & D.P. Spiller, Jr., After Decision:
Implementation of Judicial Decrees in Correctional Settings 25 (Oct. 1977) (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, U.S. Dep't of Justice). In the wake of Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), the Arkansas
prison system changed from a self-supporting "slave camp" industry with an annual
budget of $1 million, to a publicly funded system with an annual operating budget of
$6 million. Id. at 24. Both systems have been involved in subsequent litigation that required additional expenditures. An estimate of cost considerations resulting from the
orders in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 3144 (1978), and
James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974), concerning the Alabama
prison system, put the cost incurred at approximately $28,500,000, excluding the cost
of providing additional options for populations projected to 1980 and 1985. See
American Foundation, The Alabama Prison System 6 (Mar. 1977) (study prepared for
ACLU National Prison Project).
25. William G. Nagel, who has visited hundreds of American jails, some built
as early as 1817, and some built as recently as the year of his visit, points out that
even new jails are restrictive, regressive, inhumane, and punitive because they are
so dominated by preoccupation with security and control. Nagel described what he
found when visiting recently constructed facilities around the country:
Our first impression of almost all the new jails we inspected was that
they were designed in hypocrisy. Often built as part of a criminal justice
complex or civic center, they are frequently, on the exterior, inoffensive and
even attractive structures. The approaches are attractively landscaped, sometimes even including fountains and reflection pools. One warden proudly
noted that no bars are visible to outsiders-a now frequent ploy.
The overwhelming impression, once inside, is that the modern American jail, like its predecessor of the last century[,] is a cage and has changed
only superficially. The concepts of repression and human degradation are remarkably intact.
W. NAGEL, THE NEw RED BARN 20 (1973).

The National Sheriffs' Association, in similar commentary, notes that some of the
newest jails reflect obsolete concepts:
Most of this country's jails are inadequate, obsolete, and generally
lacking in basic necessities. They were constructed along traditional jail
plans which have changed very little since the beginning of the 17th century. More recently constructed jails are also based on obsolete concepts.
They have been designed primarily for dangerous or violent offenders who
make up only a small portion of the jail population. For the most part, their
outmoded design reflects a punitive philosophy which emphasizes only the
concepts of security and control. Predominantly, their physical shells are
warehouses for incarceration rather than effective tools for resolving social
problems. Unqualified incarceration has generally resulted only in further
social alienation and antisocial behavior.
NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION,. JAIL ARCHITECTURE 7 (1975), cited in NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING AND ARCHITECTURE,

THE HIGH COST OF BUILDING UNCONSTITUTIONAL JAILS 3 (1977).

In introducing a bill "to provide emergency financial assistance to certain states
and localities for the construction and modernization of correctional facilities and
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extent that congregate, coerced confinement is inherently antithetical to the human spirit, and inevitably breeds degradation and despair, the practice of imprisonment is fatally flawed: No amount of
26
amelioration will suffice.
The concept of imprisonment is itself susceptible to serious
constitutional attack. Two theories based on eighth amendment
principles illustrate potential challenges to the legality of imprisonment per se.
The Human Destruction Theory.-This theory maintains that it
is cruel to inflict punishments upon people that are so destructive
that they make it impossible for the people on whom they are in27
flicted to function effectively in a free society. In Trop v. Dulles,
the Supreme Court held that removal of citizenship is too severe
a penalty for wartime desertion, because it would result in "the to28
tal destruction of the individual's status in organized society."
The Court said:
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which
the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of
ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be
directed against him and when and for what cause his existence
in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to ban-

systems," United States Senator Joseph Biden noted that a federal district judge re-

cently had ordered a massive reduction in population "while pointing out a multitude of problems existing in a 7-year-old facility once touted as a model prison but
now termed by the judge a 'ticking time bomb.' " 124 CONG. REC. S11,972 (daily ed.
July 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
A more fundamental objection to the notion of spending large sums to try to
make prisons acceptable was put forth by Ysabel Rennie in testifying before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the House Committee on the Judiciary: "You want to appropriate money for better prisons. I say don't do it. Giving
money to the states to build better prisons is like giving money to Himmler to build
better concentration camps. It is wrong in principle." INSTEAD OF PRISONs 72 (M.
Morris ed. 1976) (quoting testimony of Ysabel Rennie).
26. Federal District Court Judge James Doyle well articulated this notion:
I am persuaded that the institution of prison probably must end. In
many respects it is as intolerable within the United States as was the institution of slavery, equally brutalizing to all involved, equally toxic to the social
system, equally subversive to the brotherhood of man, even more costly by
some standards, and probably less rational.
Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 548-49 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
27. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
28. Id. at 101.
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ishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. . . . It is
no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this
fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat
makes the punishment obnoxious. 29
Psychic distress similar to that suggested by the Court in this

passage is associated with such characteristics of imprisonment as
(1) uncertainty of release dates because of arbitrary parole release
policies, (2) an atmosphere of distrust, (3) racial animosity, (4) pow-

erlessness, (5) constant fear of violence, (6) never knowing when an
insignificant act might become grounds for disciplinary action and
prolonged confinement, (7) inability to maintain social, sexual, and
family ties, 30 (8) lack of privacy and freedom in correspondence, (9)
interruption of occupational and personal life cycles, (10) loss of
control over time and personal action, (11) insufficient physical

31
space, and (12) excruciating idleness, loneliness, and boredom.
As previously noted, several courts already have found imprison-

29. Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
30. The location of many prisons severely impedes inmates' visitation opportunities. For example, since the District of Columbia has no prison for women, female
offenders sentenced by District of Columbia courts are frequently sent to the federal
women's prison at the remote village of Alderson, West Virginia. There was no public transportation from Washington, D.C. to Alderson, nor any public lodging in the
town, until recently when concerned citizens demonstrated to secure a "flag stop"
for Amtrak trains, and purchased a house in Alderson for the use of prison visitors.
One of New York State's major facilities, situated at Dannemora, presents similar
obstacles to family visits. Dannemora is about 25 miles from the Canadian border
and more than 250 miles from either New York City or Buffalo. The federal government is now building a new prison in the same vicinity as Dannemora. It will first
be used to house athletes participating in the 1980 Winter Olympics. The structure
will eventually serve as a penal facility for youth offenders largely from New York
City and Boston. JERICHO, Feb.-June 1978, at 1, 1.
31. This list of deprivations was drawn in part from INSTEAD OF PRISONS, SUpra note 25, at 51. Such an itemization of the fundamental deprivations inherent in
imprisonment strongly suggests that imprisonment is cruel per se. Attention to the
more extreme abuses and inhumane conditions challenged in prison litigation should
not be allowed to overshadow this fact. As Dr. Menninger highlights:
Confinement anywhere is unpleasant to all animals, human beings included.
But incarceration, beginning with the jail experience, is a particularly horrible, painful, dehumanizing, character-destroying kind of confinement. I
don't think any victim ever fully recovers from the experiencel It means sustaining life for a time in an inescapable environment of evil; evil acts, evil
smells, evil sounds, evil associates, evil attitudes. It is a life in an evil and
corrupting atmosphere with hope dimmed and common decency smotheredl
There are no women companions; there are no children; there are no consistent social contacts, no appeals to intelligence or good taste.
Menninger, supra note 1, at 6.
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ment to be debilitating and to cause physical, mental, and social
deterioration. 32 Extending the Trop rationale to prison cases, a
court justifiably could hold that imprisonment "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress," effects which
continue even after release and which are so distressing and destructive as to constitute a fundamental affront to human dignity.
The Pain Without Purpose Theory.-Under this theory, punishments are cruel that inflict pain and suffering without serving a
legitimate penological purpose. In considering whether the death
penalty violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia33 suggested a new
standard for assessing the legitimacy of a particular sanction:
[T]he Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged

punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court
also must ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment. Although we cannot

"invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe
penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology," the sanction
imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification
4
that it results in the gratuitousinfliction of suffering.3

In Estelle v. Gamble,35 the Court had the opportunity to apply
the Gregg justification standard to the alleged denial of medical
care to prison inmates. Observing that "the [Eighth] Amendment
proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments,- 38 the
Court found that denial of medical care may result in "pain and
suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose,"3 7 and held such suffering inconsistent with the eighth
amendment's standard of decency. 38 Although the Court in these
32.

See notes 13-23 supra and accompanying text.

33. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34. Id. at 182-83 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
35. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
36. Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
38. A thoughtful Comment on prison reform litigation refers to the rationale of
Gregg and Estelle as "the purposive analysis" and points out that two Supreme
Court Justices would have limited states to the least severe punishment adequate to
serve legitimate purposes. The Comment notes that by requiring punishments to
meet state purposes, courts can deal objectively with many conditions of prison life
that are improper but which do not offend the subjective test of "shock[ing] the conscience." Interestingly, it seems not to have occurred to the writer of the Comment

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

13

HOFSTRA
REVIEW
[Vol. 87: 417
Hofstra
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979], Art.

cases did not find imprisonment to be "without penological justification," 39 it did provide a framework for developing this position.
The Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire
in Laaman v. Helgemoe4O rounded out these two constitutional theories with compelling force. The court noted that there is growing
recognition that incarcerated persons have a right to serve their
sentences under conditions which (1) "do not threaten their sanity
or mental well-being," (2) "are not counterproductive to the inmates' efforts to rehabilitate themselves," and (3) "do not increase
the probability of the inmates' future incarceration." 4 1 Asserting
42
that "it plainly defeats society's interests to cultivate recidivism,"
the court concluded that "punishment for one crime, under conditions which spawn future crimes and more punishment, serves no
valid legislative purpose: and, therefore, is without penological justification." 4 3 Laaman's justification test could well be applied to invalidate all imprisonment:
The touchstone is the effect upon the imprisoned. Where the
cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens
the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the
inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration, a federal court must conclude that imprisonment under such conditions does violence to our societal notions of the
intrinsic worth and dignity of human beings and, therefore, contravenes the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. 44
It is extremely disturbing that much of the current debate
concerning sentencing and sanctions has scarcely confronted the
that the purposive analysis might be used to condemn imprisonment per se. See
Comment, supra note 5, at 393.
39. 428 U.S. at 186-87. A substantial argument could be made that imprisonment does not serve legitimate state interests. For discussion of the failure of imprisonment to satisfy the public safety justifications advanced for it, see text accompa-

nying notes 97-103 infra.
40. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977). The court expressly did not rule on the
propriety of imprisonment per se. "Incarceration has been chosen by the Legislature
of New Hampshire as the punishment for most crimes, a choice neither plaintiffs nor
the court questions." Id. at 308.
41. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
42. Id (citation omitted). The court quoted the following language from Taylor
v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972): "Unless society subordinates all of the
correctional purposes to the goal of rehabilitation, it faces the paradox of promoting
the production rather than the reduction of crime." Id. at 420, quoted at 437 F.
Supp. at 316.
43. 437 F. Supp. at 316.
44. Id. at 323.
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grim realities of imprisonment. Too often, when awareness and
concern regarding the abysmal state of prisons have surfaced, they
have been resubmerged by unexamined assumptions or by despair
at the unlikelihood of making significant changes.
United States District Court Judge Marvin Frankel, for example, steadfastly supported the criminal code revision bill that
passed the Senate during the Ninety-fifth Congress 4 5 on the
grounds that it would reduce arbitrariness and disparity in
sentencing. 46 Conceding that prison sentences as presently implemented are excessively long, that the bill would do little or nothing
to reduce them, and that, in fact, it might increase them, Frankel
nonetheless endorsed the bill on the basis that it at least would
promote uniform sentences. In so doing Frankel effectively sanctioned equal harshness for all. He went on to suggest with despair
that "nobody today, when capital punishment is again fashionable
and politicians win votes by promising greater brutality toward
criminals, can hope for any improvement in this respect anytime
47
soon."
The Committee for the Study of Incarceration, established to
investigate the state of imprisonment in the United States, 48 provides another disconcerting illustration of the tenacity of the presumption for continued use of incarceration. The committee did
not recommend abolishing incarceration, either immediately or
gradually, despite its
acute awareness of the inhumanity of present conditions, [its]
sense of the inability of courts or administrative agencies to effect meaningful change in the quality of prison life, and the
strongly felt desire on the part of at least some members of the
Committee to be done with this horrendous system once and for
all. 49
The committee first asserted that the choice before it was to
"keep incarceration or fashion a severe penalty of another kind." 50
It then dismissed the few alternatives considered and concluded
that imprisonment must be retained because the alternatives failed

45. S.1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
46. Frankel, Getting Some 'Law' into Criminal Sentencing, Wash. Post, Aug. 6,
1978, at D7, col. 1. See also Kroll, Criminal-CodeReform: A 'Missed Opportunity' on
Sentencing, Wash. Post, July 15, 1978, at All, col. 1.
47. Frankel, supra note 46, at D7.
48.

A. VON HIRscH, DOING JUSTICE, at xxi (1976).

49. Id. at .xxxv.
50. Id. at 111.
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to satisfy certain practical and humanitarian standards. Astonishingly, the committee ignored the failure of imprisonment to meet
the same criteria. For example, the committee rejected corporal
punishment on grounds that (1) its severity is not amenable to objective measurement and its use is virtually impossible to control
effectively, and (2) it poses disturbing ethical problems: "Besides
any physical pain involved, intentional corporal maltreatment
evokes in its victims intense feelings of humiliation and terror....
Ought a civilized state ever to visit such mortifications?" 51 The
facts revealed in the many court cases concerning the cruel nature
of confinement52 illustrate the futility of attempting to assess or
control the severity of imprisonment. Furthermore, numerous
courts have decried prisons for the feelings of terror and degradation they generate among those held captive. The very conditions
which led the committee to discard alternatives to confinement
permeate our prison system. The committee should have applied
consistently the standards it had developed and rejected imprisonment as ineffective and unethical.
The committee failed to confront directly the very questions
which it initially and properly had posed for itself. "Ought we to
have incarceration at all? Is it appropriate for any purpose
whatsoever to place men or women behind walls, to resort to collective residential restraint?"a "Is it really necessary to inflict so

much suffering?" 54 Dr. Menninger has suggested that the committee might have reached different conclusions about the propriety of prisons if it had attempted to provide a real description of
incarceration or its effects upon the incarcerated. Menninger inquired whether any of the professors and scholars on the
committee ever had been inside a jail
[1long enough to feel it? Had they ever visited a bullpen on a
hot night or tried to walk through one without slipping? Have
any of them tried to live for a time with the smells, the sweat,
the vomit, the urine, the mace, the accumulation of bad breath?
More the debilitating heat, the fetid air, the broiling summer
sun flickering through dirty, half-closed windows. Had or have
any members of this august Committee looked closely at-I
won't say reclined on one of the soiled, torn, lumpy mattresses
infested with insects and vermin from which there is no relief
51. Id. & n.*.
52. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
53. A. VoN HMRSCH, supra note 48, at xxii-xxiii.
54.

Id. at 3.
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through the long nights? Have any Committeemen ever been
subjected-in the dark-to roaches, lice and bedbugs?
I will not ask if any member of the Committee has ever
seen blood running down a trouser leg, or heard the sobs and
screams of a boy being chain-raped, with accompanying grunts
55
and raucous shouts.

While rapid change is characteristic of our times, nothing
seems to change in our prisons. Menninger's contemporary description sounds a great deal like Oscar Wilde's impressions of the
Reading Gaol in the last century:
Each narrow cell in which we dwell
Is a foul and dark latrine,
And the fetid breath of living Death
Chokes up each grated screen,
And all, but Lust, is turned to dust
56
In Humanity's machine.
The Committee for the Study of Incarceration, like many others, failed to face squarely the threshold question: Is imprisonment
an acceptable social practice? If it is not, then its continued use is
wrong. There is no justification for our tolerance of the strange rationalization that "incarceration may be unacceptable, but we
haven't an alternative." If imprisonment is not satisfactory, we
must shift to different forms of punishment which embody respect

for human dignity. Just as we stopped branding, flogging, and cutting off hands because such practices were considered unspeakably

cruel, current standards of decency require that we now stop
caging people.

THE

INJUSTICE AND IRRATIONALITY OF PRISON USE

In addition to moral and humanitarian objections to imprisonment per se, there are other strong reasons to move away from the
55. Menninger, supra note 1, at 7.
56. 0. WILDE, The Ballad of Reading Gaol, in POEMs 253, 281 (1910). When
Wilde, the English poet and dramatist, was a prisoner in Reading Gaol in 1896, there

also were three children serving sentences for snaring rabbits.
Like the most hardened felons awaiting trial, they slept on plank beds in
cells with solid iron doors; they were crying with hunger. A kindly warder
gave the smallest child a few biscuits, and for this was dismissed from his
post. The children had been imprisoned because their parents were too poor
to pay their fines. They were released only when Wilde paid them himself.
Y. RENNIE, THE SEARCH FOR CRIMINAL MAN, A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF THE
DANGEROUS OFFENDER 271-72 (1978) (citing H. HYDE, OSCAR WILDE: A BIOGRAPHY 315-17 (1975)).
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practice of human confinement. Prisons are a vivid manifestation of
an unjust system-a system which cages the least powerful, rather
than those who cause the most harm. In ancient Greece, slaves
were punished in their bodies, citizens, in their property. 57 Modem America also has a dual system for dealing with harmful behavior. The "slow tortures" of imprisonment are suffered almost exclusively by the poor and minorities for "street crimes," many of
which do not involve violence. The rich and influential rarely are
imprisoned, even when their "suite crimes" cause serious injury or
death.
It has become popular to advocate imprisonment for business
crimes as a means of reducing class disparity in sentencing. It is
extremely unlikely, however, that white-collar offenses will be pursued as vigorously as "street crimes" or that the severe incarcerative punishments heretofore reserved for the powerless ever will
be applied on a broad scale to the powerful. 58 To equalize
sentencing and to eliminate this dual punishment system, the most
hopeful course lies in using less drastic sanctions in place of imprisonment for all offenses.
Unfair Use of Imprisonment
Nearly half of the people being held in our prisons are black,
although blacks constitute less than fifteen percent of the population in this country. 59 In 1973, in the thirty-eight jurisdictions for
which there were data, the incarceration rate for blacks was at least
three times the rate for whites; in one-third of these jurisdictions it
was ten times greater.60 Most of those confined are poor. In 1974,
57.

J.T. SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 18 (1976).

58.

See text accompanying notes 68-96 infra.

59. Table 6.18, Estimated Number of Inmates of State CorrectionalFacilities,
by Selected Demographic Characteristics,United States, 1974, in SOtURcEBooK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1977, at 616 (M. Gottfredson, M. Hindelange & N.

Parisi eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977 SOURCEBOOK]. This source estimates that
blacks constituted about 47 percent of the population of state prisons in 1974. Id.

60. Dunbaugh, Racially DisproportionateRates of Incarcerationin the United
States, 1 PRISON L. MONITOR 205, 220 (1979). This article, based on 1973 data,
shows that the median incarceration rate for the white population was 43.5 prisoners

per 100,000 population, while the median rate for the black population was 367.5
prisoners per 100,000 population. Id. at 220. The study includes data and incarceration rates from 50 jurisdictions for whites (District of Columbia and all states except
Connecticut) and from 38 jurisdictioris for blacks (limited to those with 25,000 or
more blacks in the population). Id. at 221. What is striking about the data is that it is
in sharp contrast with the pattern of incarceration rates in other industrialized coun-

tries. See note 88 infra. Forty of the 50 jurisdictions had white incarceration rates
within the range of -: 50% of the median, that is, they incarcerated between 22 and
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only fourteen percent of state prison inmates reported incomes in
the year before their arrests of $10,000 or more; twenty-four percent of the prisoners earned less than $2000.61 As the Solicitor
General of the United States has noted, "[Elvery racial and economic group that is found at the bottom of the social ladder in any
region of the country is also found disproportionately represented
62
in the prison population of that region."
It is often assumed that the characteristics of the prison population mirror the facts about who is committing serious crimes.
However, two lines of recently assembled evidence cast doubt on
this assumption. The first set of analyses implies that use of imprisonment is more closely associated with racial and economic factors
than with criminality. The second set suggests that the criminal
justice system ignores a large body of serious offenses, so that
many persons engaged in harmful, illegal conduct never become liable to criminal punishments, including incarceration. Taken together, these facts strongly suggest that those imprisoned are not
necessarily those who inflict the greatest harm on society. Such evidence leads to the conclusion that prison sentences are imposed
neither fairly nor sensibly.
A number of studies have explored relationships between
socioeconomic factors and imprisonment. William G. Nagel compared crime rates with incarceration rates and with other variables. 6 3 He found that "there is no significant correlation between a
state's racial composition and its crime rate but there is a very
great positive relationship between its racial composition and its

63 white people per 100,000 population. Every jurisdiction incarcerated at least 149
black per 100,000 population; 29 of them locked up more than 300 blacks per
100,000 population.

61. Table 6.18, Estimated Number of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities,
by Selected Demographic characteristics, United States, 1974, in 1977 SouRcEBOOK, supra note 59, at 616. Five percent of the inmates reported earning no

income. Id.
62. Address by Wade H. McCree, Solicitor General of the United States, Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan 50th Annual Conference 1516 (July 29,
1977). But see Transcript, Press Conference of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell (Nov.
1, 1977) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review). The Attorney General of the
United States stated, "[I]n my judgment, it's only the well-to-do that ever go to
prison." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).

63. Nagel, On Behalf of a Moratorium on Prison Construction, 23 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 154 (1977). The crime rates are based on the FBI's Uniform Crime
Reports which reflect crimes reported to the police and are limited largely to "street
crimes." The incarceration rates represent the ratio of a jurisdiction's population
which is imprisoned. The rates vary a great deal.
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incarceration rate." 64 The same study found that "states with a
high incidence of persons living below the poverty level tend to
have a lower crime rate but a higher incarceration rate." 65 This

and other studies also have noted a relationship between incarceration rates and unemployment rates. A study performed for the
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress found that a one percent increase in unemployment was correlated with a four percent

increase in state prison admissions. 66 Another study concluded that
regardless of changes in crime rates, "as the total number of unemployed persons increases, the total number of persons present in
and admitted to prisons also increases."6 7

Although the average person "thinking about crime" may not
consider organizational or business crime, 68 the second line of evi-

dence demonstrates that the economic and human costs of this category of crime are staggering and may outstrip by a substantial
margin damage done by "common crimes." This reality makes it
especially troubling that criminal justice resources (including confinement) are skewed heavily toward "street crime." 69 Although
64. Id. at 162 (emphasis in original). A reanalysis of Nagel's findings generally
confirmed the results. See J. Nagel, Crime and Incarceration: A Reanalysis (Sept.
1977) (unpublished paper on file with the National Council on Crime and Delinquency).
65. Nagel, supra note 63,at 162 (emphasis in original),
66. See H. Brenner, Estimating the Social Costs of Economic Policy, Table I
(Oct. 1976), reprinted in JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946-THRTIETH ANNIVER-

SARY REVIEW, at v (Comm. Print 1976) (Paper No. 5).
67. Jankovic, Labor Market and Imprisonment, 8 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 17, 22
(1977).
68. James Q. Wilson, in his popular book on this subject, typifies this tendency
when he says,
Unless otherwise stated or clearly implied, the word "crime" when used
alone in this book refers to predatory crime for gain, the most common forms
of which are robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
This book deals neither with "white-collar crimes" nor, except for heroin addiction, with so-called "victimless crimes." Partly this reflects the limits of my own knowledge, but it also reflects my conviction, which I believe
is the conviction of most citizens, that predatory street crime is a far more
serious matter than consumer fraud, antitrust violations, prostitution, or
gambling.
J.Q. WILSON, THINIaNG ABOUT CRIME, at xx (1975).
69. A recent study done by the GAO for the Subcommittee on Crime of the
House Committee on the Judiciary reveals that approximately 5.1% of the total
budget of the Department of Justice for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 was expended for
white-collar crime and public corruption. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, RESOURCES DEVOTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO COMBAT
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 2 (1979). See generally SUBCOMM.
ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., WHITE
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much discussion is devoted to "law and order" and swift apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of law violators, the system
makes little pretense of actually trying to enforce all laws. Dangerous and harmful business practices frequently lie outside the reach
of the criminal law. Furthermore, criminal justice agents make little attempt to protect us from those business practices which have
been defined as crimes. Police and prosecutors generally are not
trained, equipped, or expected to deal effectively with such matters as consumer fraud, embezzlement, pollution of air and water,
corruption, racial discrimination, and exposure of employees and
consumers to toxic substances.
Although the criminal justice system largely ignores business
crime, the direct short-term economic impact of this type of crime
is at least ten times greater than that attributable to "street crimes"
against property, 70 and it frequently results in serious bodily harm.
Evidence revealed in civil litigation concerning the behavior of officials in the asbestos industry offers a shocking case in point. It appears that on the instructions of industry officials, physicians concealed vital medical information from asbestos workers. 7 Workers
were not informed that they had developed symptoms of
asbestosis, although the
disease is treatable in early stages and may
72
be fatal if not treated.
Incredibly, it appears to be common for officials to deny and
impede recognition of connections between dangerous substances
and disease. As another example, the relationship between coal
dust and black lung was denied in this country for thirty years after
COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE (Comm. Print 1978)
[hereinafter cited as WHITE COLLAR CRIME].

70. The United States Chamber of Commerce estimated that the short term, direct cost of white-collar crime in 1974 was more than $40 billion, not including antitrust violations such as price fixing. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, A Handbook on White Collar Crime: Everyone's Problem, Everyone's Loss
5 (1974), cited in WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 69, at 8. In 1976, the Joint Eco-

nomic Committee of the Congress estimated that the cost of street crimes against
property, such as breaking and entering or robbery, amounted to the comparatively
low total figure of $4 billion annually. WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 69, at 10. A
Ralph Nader report estimated that monopolies cost consumers $48 to $60 billion a
year because of fixed prices, lost production, and lack of innovation. Nader Report:
Consumers Lose Billions to Invisible Bilk, 1971 CRIME & L. 21, cited in M.
PARENTi, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW 129 (1977).
71. Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
72. Id. As many as three thousand asbestos workers die prematurely each year
as a result of exposure to asbestos in the workplace. N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE
WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 324 (1976), cited in L. Schrager
& J. Short, Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime 1 (1977) (unpublished paper
on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Schrager & Short].
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it was accepted in Great Britain. 73 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health estimates that seven to fifteen million
workers currently are exposed without their knowledge to toxic
substances in products sold under trade names. 74 Although all such
instances of exposure may not involve criminal conduct or liability
of business officials, illegal practices are far from unusual. One estimate concerning occupational accidents placed the number of
deaths at 14,200 and the number of disabling injuries at 2.2 million
in 1970 alone. 75 Studies suggest that more than half of these accidents are attributable to illegal safety violations or legal but unsafe
76
conditions.
Similar to the workers' situation, concern about business
crimes against consumers generally focuses only on economic damage. However, about 20 million serious personal injuries annually
are associated with consumer products; approximately 110,000 injuries result in permanent disability, and 30,000 in death. 77 As with
attempting to assess employer liability for harm to employees,
"readily available data do not specify the contribution of illegal
versus legal, dangerous actions to these figures. Both the acute and
chronic dangers of consumer products may be illustrated by the replacement of much highly flammable children's sleepwear by Tris7
coated cancer-producing sleepwear."
A number of cases are now being exposed in which unsafe
business practices have endangered, injured, or destroyed whole
communities.
One of the worst man-made disasters in this country's history
began early one morning in February 1972. A coal company's
massive coal-waste refuse pile, which dammed a stream in Middle Fork Hollow in the mountains of West Virginia, collapsed
without warning to the people in the long, narrow Buffalo Creek
Valley below. This failure unleashed over 130 million gallons of
water and waste materials-stream water from recent rains as
73. Schrager & Short, supra note 72, at 21.
74. Exposure to Toxic Substances by Millions of Unaware Workers Warned at
Hearing, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1977, at 10, col. 1.

75. N. ASHFORD, supra note 72, at 108-15, cited in Schrager & Short, supra
note 72, at 20.

76. Id.
77.

Schrager & Short, supra note 72, at 22. This latter figure is equal to approx-

imately one and one half times the number of murders and nonnegligent manslaughters committed nationally each year in 1974 and 1975. Table 3.99, Estimated Number
and Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)of Offenses Known to Police, by Offense, Region,
and State, 1974-75, in 1977 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 59, at 404-05.
78. Schrager & Short, supra note 72, at 22 (citation omitted).
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well as black coal-waste water and sludge from a coal-washing
operation. This 20-to-30-foot tidal wave of rampaging water and
sludge, sometimes traveling at speeds up to 30 miles per hour,
devastated Buffalo Creek's sixteen small communities.
Over 125 people perished immediately. Most were women
and children unable to struggle out from under the thick black
water choked with crushed and splintered homes, cars, telephone poles, railroad tracks, and all manner of other debris.
There were over 4,000 survivors, but their 1,000 homes were
destroyed as well as most of their possessions. 79
Painstaking legal investigation showed that although mining
company officials did not intend to kill those who perished, they
knowingly maintained an illegal dam, placing considerations of
profit above those of human life.8 0 These examples illustrate the
need to broaden public perceptions as to what constitutes a crime
of violence.
In the 1940's Edwin Sutherland studied seventy of the largest
and most influential corporations in the United States. He found
that every corporation had been charged with more than one illegal
act, and on the average, had been cited fourteen times for violations of law by a court or regulatory agency. 8 ' The elite perpetrators of such lawless activity suffer consequences far different from
those which befall so-called "common criminals." "Any ordinary
citizen with such a conviction record would be judged an 'habitual
offender' deserving of heavy punishment. Yet the guilty companies
were provided with special stipulations, desist orders, injunctions,
82
and negotiated settlements or were let off with light penalties."
Organizations cannot be imprisoned, but the individuals within
them can. Yet, those responsible for corporate malfeasance seldom
are prosecuted. In the first three years of enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,83 for example, no individual was convicted or imprisoned, although criminal fines were
8 4
levied against organizations.
79. G. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE STORY OF THE SURVIVORS' UNPRECEDENTED LAwSUIT, at ix (1976).

80. See id.
81.

Of the 980 separate violations Sutherland discovered, 307 were for restraint

of trade, 222 for patent infringement, 158 for unfair labor practices, 97 for false advertising, and 66 for illegal rebates. E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CluME 272
(1949), cited in WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 69, at 13.
82.

M. PARENTI, supra note 70, at 129.

83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
84.

Schrager & Short, supra note 72, at 5-6. While an organization cannot be
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Redressing the Punishment Imbalance
There is little correspondence between offenders who cause
serious injury and harm and those persons who actually are imprisoned. Of course, many persons who are imprisoned have done
great harm. However, many others are imprisoned for property offenses involving dollar amounts far less significant than those of
white-collar offenses for which perpetrators never risk any substantial threat of imprisonment.
Many observers react to this inequality by suggesting that
there be a "crackdown" on white-collar offenses and more prison
sentences for those who commit them. This, in fact, is the current
ambition of the United States Department of Justice.8 5 However, if
overcoming the traditional preoccupation with street crime is dependent on significantly increasing resources allotted for detecting,
prosecuting, and imprisoning offenders involved in organizational
crimes, success is unlikely.
The United States is facing widespread economic problems.
Inflation is wiping out savings. Rising taxes have spawned a wave
of voter-sponsored proposals to restrain government taxing power
and spending. Worldwide confidence in the American economy has
diminished. There is a growing realization that long term government programs have mortgaged the incomes of future generations.
In this context it is unrealistic to expect vast new appropriations to
repair, improve, or expand the criminal justice system.
The limits on how much people are willing to expand the
criminal justice system already are being reached, especially with
respect to imprisonment. By urging passage of tougher laws and
sentenced to time in prison, as a criminal sanction it can be restricted, restrained, or

even dissolved. It is indeed peculiar that there seems to be greater reluctance to destroy a corporation than to destroy an individual.

85. See, e.g., Address by Griffin B. Bell, United States Attorney General, to the
United States Chamber of Commerce Business Advisory Panel on White Collar
Crime (Nov. 30, 1978).
We must increase the cost to the offenders of committing such crimes by
ensuring his or her detection, quick prosecution and punishment more severe than only the possible loss of reputdtion and community standing. Imposition of prison sentences joined with appropriate fines should be the
rule, with probation and early parole reserved only for the most exceptional
cases.
Id. at 7. The Deputy Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti, in nearly identical language, advocates the same position, but suggests that "[i]mposition of heavy prison

terms joined with appropriate fines should be the rule." See Fisk, Crime, TRIAL, Oct.
1978, at 41 (emphasis added).
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stiffer penalties, the "new realists"'8 6 have created a dilemma for
legislators who recognize this "get tough" public sentiment, but are
reluctant to finance full implementation of such laws. The outcome
of this interplay of forces has been described clearly by Caleb
Foote.
[T]he basic function of discretion in paroling and sentencing
practice is . . .to adjust an impossible penal code to the reality
of severe limitations in punishment resources. . . . What we
have evolved is a system of symbolic punishment in which each
[prison] inmate stands for half a dozen or a dozen other convicted felons who are by any standards equally eligible to be

there but for whom there are no beds. This system is efficient in
court administration, for the threat of being the symbol keeps

the guilty pleas flowing smoothly. It is economical by costbenefit standards, for it probably maximizes the return in gen-

eral deterrence for dollars expended. It is politically expedient,
at least in the short run, because it dupes and pacifies an otherwise potentially rebellious public. It is also, in my opinion, profoundly immoral, violates the spirit of due process and equal
protection, turns our criminal courts into sausage factories and
87
breeds disrespect for law in most of those whom it touches.
86. The "new realists" urge more stringent policies for "getting tough on criminals." James Q. Wilson exemplifies the "new realist" when he asserts that "we have
trifled with the wicked, made sport of the innocent, and encouraged the calculators."
J.Q. WILSON, supra note 68, at 209. Ernest van den Haag, in arguing that anyone
convicted of a third offense should be imprisoned until age 40, has commented that
"[if one looks at the present practices of the criminal justice system, . . .one may
think that it was to secure the happiness of lawbreakers that our government was instituted." Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings on S. 1437 Before the
Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8915, 8923 (1977) (statement of Ernest van den Haag) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]. Such "get tough" cries are hard to reconcile with the
realities of crime and incarceration levels. Data from the national victimization surveys conducted by the Census Bureau in the years 1973 through 1976 show that the
crimes studied remained relatively constant from year to year, even within offense
categories. The rate of personal violence reported was 32 crimes per 1000 persons in
all four years, for example. It appears that:
During the four years of national victimization surveys, the country was
in the grip not of a crime wave but of a wave of punitiveness. The most visible result of this was the bulging of federal, state, and local prisons and jails.
Combined jail and prison populations increased by almost 200,000 to a record 533,000 in 1977. Yet the record number of "incapacitated" criminals
did not result in greater safety for the American public.
Doleschal, Social Forces and Crime, 10 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 395, 409 (1978).
87. Foote, Deceptive Determinate Sentencing, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
LAwv ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING--REFORM
OR REGRESSION? 133, 138 (1978).
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Americans must recognize that we cannot afford to incarcerate
people at the present levels. It has been accurately noted that "Europeans generally dish out [prison] time in spoonfuls; we use buckets."8 8 In light of high construction costs (up to $57,000 per prisoner space)8 9 and direct operating costs (as much as $26,000 per
year per prisoner),9 0 it is folly to rely on policies which require increased use of prisons. Since nonincarcerative punishments are

dramatically less expensive, it is apparent that our scarce punishment resources should be reallocated.
If we are serious about concentrating on the criminal activities
that cause the most harm, priorities must be rearranged and meth-

ods refocused. Such a reordering could follow one of two directions: (1) We could incarcerate only persons convicted of the most
serious offenses; or (2) we could employ less drastic and less costly
sanctions for all those convicted of crime.
The first option-that only persons convicted of the most serious offenses be incarcerated-has been advanced by numerous individuals and organizations in recent years. The National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, in a major policy statement, argues

that "[cionfinement is necessary only for offenders who, if not con-

fined, would be a serious danger to the public." 9 1 The National
88. Rothman, Doing Time, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1977, at A21, col. 3. The United
States incarceration rate (approximately 235 per 100,000) is in sharp contrast with
the much lower rates in Europe and elsewhere. The following rates for 1971 or 1972
were reported in Wailer & Chan, Prison Use: A Canadian and International Comparison, 17 CraM. L.Q. 47, 58 (1974) (Table A-Selected countries and the number of
persons in prison per 100,000 persons in the population): New Zealand (92.7), Canada (90.0), England and Wales (81.3), Denmark (69.8), Sweden (61.4), France (61.1),
Italy (51.2), Japan (46.5), Spain (39.9), Norway (37.1), and the Netherlands (22.4).
Several European countries are affirmatively acting to decrease further the use of
prisons. For example, in 1975, the Swedish Minister of Justice announced a plan to
reduce the prison population by about 75%. Salomon, Lessons From the Swedish
CriminalJustice System: A Reappraisal,FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1976, at 40, 42.
89. N. Singer & V. Wright, Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards: Institutional-Based Programs and Parole 17-18 (Jan. 1976) (project conducted by Correctional Economics Center). This calculation, expressed in then-current dollars, derived
from a sample of recently constructed or planned institutions. Id. at 17.
90. Coopers & Lybrand, The Cost of Incarceration in New York City 5 (Jan.
17, 1978) (cost study sponsored by National Council on Crime and Delinquency), As
the title of this study suggests, this estimate, although broadly representative, is for
New York City only, for the year ending June 30, 1976. Id. at 1.
91. Board of Directors, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, The
Nondangerous Offender Should Not Be Imprisoned, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 449,
449 (1973). The National Council's policy envisions two kinds of "dangerous offenders" for whom imprisonment would be necessary: (1) the offender who has
committed a serious crime against a person and shows a behavior pattern of persistent assaultiveness based on serious mental disturbances, and (2) the offender deeply
involved in organized crime. Id. at 456.
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Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in
recommending that incarceration be reserved for those instances in
which no other lesser penalty would serve, said, "It is clear that a
dramatic realignment of correctional methods is called for.... The
criminal justice system should become the agency of last resort for
social problems. The institution should be the last resort for correctional problems."92 These are but a few of the many who advocate
reordering priorities so that incarceration will be employed on a
more rational and nondiscriminatory basis. 93
Although these recommendations represent movement in the
right direction, they still contain significant dangers that require
careful consideration. It is neither an accident nor a surprise that
poor people and minorities bear the greatest burden of imprisonment. By and large, the criminal laws have been designed,
adopted, and enforced to protect the interests of white men of
means.9 4 Women, minorities, and poor people have had little effective part in the political processes by which laws are enacted
and within which enforcement policies, priorities, and budgets are
set. To many of those controlling the operation of the criminal
laws,
crime is something which shabby, strange, foreign-looking men
do, ugly men, men with hairy faces, long-haired and strangely
garbed young "hoodlums," black men, brown men, red men
"prowling" (or just standing or walking) in white men's neighborhoods. Crime is not something in which courteous, well-dressed,
white gentlemen get involved .... 95
It is fantasy to expect judges in today's society to send "courteous, well-dressed, white gentlemen" to prison. Given the uncivilized nature of our prisons, it defies belief that a significant number
of offenders convicted of business crimes, even of the most serious
92. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS].
93. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 48.
94. Clarence Darrow understood the dynamics:

Those men who own the earth make the laws to protect what they have.
They fix up a sort of fence or pen around what they have, and they fix the
law so the fellow on the outside cannot get in. The laws are really organized
for the protection of the men who rule the world. They were never organized or enforced to do justice. We have no system for doing justice, not the
slightest in the world.
C. DARROW, Address to the Prisoners in the Cook County Jail (1902), in ATTORNEY
FOR THE DAMNED 3, 11-12 (A. Weinberg ed. 1957).
95. Y. MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN? 56 (1973).
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type, ever will be locked in with offenders convicted of serious
street crimes. 9 6 If white-collar and street-crime offenders are to be
sentenced to comparable punishments for offenses of similar seriousness, the punishments will have to be less severe than imprisonment.
The second option around which to restructure our priorities
-turning to nonincarcerative sanctions for all offenders-thus
seems far more promising. However, many argue that incarcerative
punishments cannot be abandoned because they are necessary for
public safety. Most of the leading social policy objectives advanced
in support of imprisonment are oriented around crime reduction or
control: deterring potential offenders from committing crimes,
incapacitating convicted offenders to prevent them from engaging
in crimes, and rehabilitating offenders so that they will choose not
to commit crimes in the future. Even retribution sometimes is
viewed as serving a deterrence function to the extent that people

96. A GAO study of sentencing practices in federal district courts for the year
ending June 30, 1977, found that of those districts with 25 or more sentences for
bank embezzlement and for bank robbery, none imprisoned more than 30% of those
-convicted of embezzlement and none imprisoned less than 78% of those convicted
of bank robbery. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, REDUCING FEDERAL SENTENCING AND PROSECUTING DISPARITIES: A
SYSTEMwIDE APPROACH NEEDED 7 (1979).

Some sentences imposed the past year in white-collar crime cases have
raised again the question of even-handedness in the administration of criminal justice. In one case a person who over a period of years embezzled more
than half a million dollars received a sentence of outright probation, plus a
token $1,000 fine. Another who stole more than fifty thousand dollars received probation while two who separately stole a quarter of a million dollars received sentences of six months. Another public official who stole
thirty to forty thousand dollars of public monies to help build himself a new
house received a six month sentence subsequently reduced to about three
months.
Lenient sentences of this kind are very disturbing; they are, in the view
of this Office, neither just on the merits nor do they appear to be just. They
create in the eyes of the public a perception of preferential treatment by the
criminal justice process for those with status and wealth.
Certainly, this Office could insist on every white collar case going to
trial unless the defendant pled guilty to the entire indictment. The cost
would be high-a drain on the court's resources and very much so on the
prosecution's by dramatically limiting the number of cases it can investigate.
White collar crime cases are tremendously time consuming; they require an
enormous investment of investigative and prosecutorial resources, both to
investigate and to try.
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Report-Fiscal Year 1977, at 5
(Feb. 1978).
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abstain from law violations to avoid receiving the deserts of their
acts.
There is a substantial and growing body of information and
sentiment emphasizing the injustice of employing utilitarian objectives as a basis for selecting punishments. 97 For example, although
proponents of incapacitative incarceration would not be apt to explain it thus, the essence of what they advocate is confinement of
persons who the government asserts may (we cannot be sure)
someday (we know not when) commit an act (we know not what)
which somehow (we know not how) will endanger some other person or persons (we know not who). Yet the factfinding process by
which people are selected for such preventive confinement does
not even purport to examine the when, what, how, and who of the
feared future offense. 98 Imprisonment is a highly intrusive form of
state intervention into an individual's life. To impose it as a punishment for past, proved acts is an extremely harsh response, too
harsh, perhaps, for any offense. But to subject persons to imprisonment for what we guess they might do in the future constitutes a
gross denial of human rights. Yet the utilitarian crime-reduction
rationales for imprisonment remain popular. The notion that prisons must be employed to confine "dangerous criminals" is particularly tenacious.
It is especially disquieting to note theorists who utilize the
utilitaian rationales for incarceration although they are aware of
the injustice in doing this. Ernest van den Haag, for example,
maintains:
[A]Ithough [I am] uneasy about the justice of post punishment confinement [for incapacitative purposes,] I believe the
protection of society must have priority over the freedom and
the comfort of offenders. It is better to confine an offender, even
after he has served his punishment, than to let harm come to innocent victims, as long as there is good reason to believe that he
is still dangerous. An offender found to be still dangerous who
actually is not is in the same unfortunate situation as a suspect

97. See, e.g., N. Momaus, supra note 93; A. VON HrRsCH, supra note 48; Harris,
Disquisitionon the Need for a New Model for Criminal Sanctioning Systems, 77 W.
VA. L. REv. 263 (1975).
98. Of course, as has been noted, "[w]e have among us at all times a large
number of people who will sooner or later commit violent acts. Most of these people
are undetected and, in practical and also constitutional terms, undetectable as to
their violent potential." Cantor, An End to Crime and Punishment, 39 SHINGLE 99,
112 (1976).
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found guilty who actually is not. We must do our utmost to min-

imize these cases, short of failing to punish the guilty and not
confining the dangerous. 99

It is important to recognize, however, that even if considera-

tions of public protection are placed above those of fairness and
justice, it is dubious whether imprisonment plays a meaningful role

in crime control. It is even more questionable whether any
changes made in the criminal justice system could appreciably reduce crime.
Existing evidence concerning whether imprisonment serves to
deter crime is inconclusive, 1 0 but it is popularly believed that

increasing the likelihood of going to prison or the length of prison
terms deters some people from committing crimes. There is also
limited evidence suggesting that crime among people at liberty can
be reduced to some extent by incapacitating certain persons. However, massive increases in imprisonment would be necessary to

achieve an incapacitative effect that would reduce the crime rate
significantly. For example, one study concluded that the most efficient incapacitation policy, in the sense of yielding the greatest

crime reduction and the lowest prison-population increase, would
be to incarcerate all persons convicted of felonies for 1.2 years.101
99. E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 3, at 250. When decisions are based on the
possibility that a person may commit a crime rather than on a process which, although admittedly imperfect, is designed to be impartial, objective, based on established standards, and directed toward ascertaining the facts as to actual past events, a
great leap has been made away from basic principles of law.
100. The Information Center of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency reviewed 100 recent studies, articles, and books on deterrence, and reached
inconclusive findings. For each study that concluded that imprisonment reduces
crime, through a deterrent effect, another study concluded that it did not. Similarly,
an assessment of research studies on deterrence carried out by the Panel of Research
on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, established by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, found that no definitive conclusions could
be offered on the deterrent effect of sentences. The Panel did conclude that deterrence is only one of many possible explanations for those studies indicating that
higher sanction levels are associated with less crime. Dr. Alfred Blumstein, who
chaired the Panel, stated that the "major challenge for future research is to estimate
the magnitude of the effects of different sanctions on various crime types, an issue
on which none of the evidence available thus far provides very useful guidance."
Blumstein, Research on Deterrent and IncapacitativeEffects of Criminal Sanctions,
6 J. CraM. JUST. 5 (1978). The Panel's report was published as NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIvE EFFECTS, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION].

101. J. Petersilia & P. Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences: Their Projected Effects on Crime and Prison Populations, at iii (Oct. 1977) (report prepared
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Theoretically, this could reduce overall crime by 20 percentalthough reducing violent crime by only 10.9 percent-but would
increase the prison population by 85 percent, or about a quarter of
a million new prisoners. 10 2 The budgetary implications of such a
policy shift alone would make its adoption highly unlikely. The
same is true with respect to implementing proposals designed to
enhance deterrence by increasing the odds of prison punishment.
There simply is little possibility that the certainty of conviction and
imprisonment will be increased to an extent necessary to give such
potential effects any chance of operating.
There is little debate that rehabilitation is ill-served by imprisonment. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals concluded:
The failure of major institutions to reduce crime is incontestable. Recidivism rates are notoriously high. Institutions do
succeed in punishing, but they do not deter. They protect the
community, but that protection is only temporary. They relieve
the community of responsibility by removing the offender, but
they make successful reintegration into the community unlikely.
They change the committed offender, but the change is more
likely to be negative than positive.1 0 3
While some of those incarcerated may undergo positive change,
prisons are probably the worst setting in which to seek this
change. Thus, few of those concerned with rehabilitation will argue
that prisons are necessary for that purpose.
The idea that prisons are needed to protect the public is based
on myth. Imprisonment in record-high doses has not succeeded in
securing domestic tranquility. Placing our hopes on more of the
same is seriously misguided.
It is clear that imprisonment never will be imposed on all persons who seriously endanger others. As long as only a symbolic set
under grant from National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
LEAA, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
102. Id. See also DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 100; Van
Dine, Dinitz & Conrad, The Incapacitationof the Dangerous Offender: A Statistical
Experiment, 14 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 22 (1977). Furthermore, the
impacts projected in these studies were based on "street crime" type offenses. We
have no idea whether or how much incarceration prescribed at various levels might
deter or effectively incapacitate persons participating in organizational crimes. Pre-

sumably, a substantial increase in law enforcement attention also would be required
before the certainty of apprehension, conviction, and punishment could reach significant levels.
103. CORRECTIONS, supra note 92, at 1.
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of those eligible are caged, racial and economic biases will affect
the selection process. Thus, to equalize justice and focus law enforcement efforts on the crimes of greatest concern, it is imperative
that new priorities be set and that less expensive, nonincarcerative
penalties be employed for all offenders.
ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS AND NEW CONCERNS

Recognizing that prisons with their attendant evils are not essential to community peace and security frees us to pursue justice
in ways more harmonious with America's traditional human values.
This is not a vain hope, but a real prospect. Shortrange social policies cannot be expected to eliminate crime and violence, but society can respond to crime in ways that are nonviolent, just, and
consistent with our collective interests. By illustrating the wide variety of nonincarcerative sanctions already in operation, this section
is intended to stimulate discussion about their functioning, the purposes they should serve, and the new issues they pose.
Probation is probably the best known alternative to incarceration. During this century, its use has grown to the point that well
over a million persons are under probation supervision at any given
time.10 4 Under a probation sentence, convicted offenders remain at
liberty in the community subject to varying levels of supervision
and a variety of conditions established by sentencing courts. Numerous other nonincarcerative sanctions, although not as common
as probation, are increasingly being implemented and accepted;
these alternatives deserve still greater attention.
Available methods for reducing the use of confinement include
eliminating some criminal statutes and otherwise limiting the jurisdiction of criminal courts, developing alternatives to conventional
adjudication, minimizing defendants' penetration into the criminal
system, and utilizing alternative sanctions within the structure of
the criminal law. Statutes and enforcement practices that bring
within the criminal justice system persons who are mentally ill or
alcoholic or who voluntarily and privately engage in practices
which differ from espoused norms-so called "victimless crimes"10 5
should be eliminated.
104. See generally National Crimiial Justice Information Service, LEAA, State
and Local Probation and Parole Systems (Feb. 1978); Klapmuts, Community
Alternatives to Prison,5 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE 305 (1973).

105. It has been suggested that decriminalization can occur as a result of po-
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Many of the interests fostered and protected by governmental
action ordinarily are not connected with the criminal process. 106
Philadelphia attorney Gilbert M. Cantor has gone so far as to suggest that all criminal laws could be abolished and the mechanisms
of the criminal justice system totally dismantled without harm to
public interests. 10 7 Cantor maintains that reliance on civil litigation
to allow victims of crime to recover damages suffered would shift
the emphasis "from harming the 'criminal' to helping the victim,"108 and would foster a movement towards building responsible
behavior as the desired norm of a free society. In Cantor's scheme,
civil confinement for treatment would be permitted, at least initially, under strict legal constraints where a defendant's behavior
was especially outrageous or bizarre.' 0 9 However, the vast majority
of cases would be handled through tort actions for money damages,
including punitive or exemplary damages, and other civil remedies
such as injunctions and contempt proceedings."i 0 Cantor also urges
greater use of the "composition," that is, an adjustment between
the parties."' In such an adjustment, a defendant agrees, with the
lice, prosecutorial, or judicial policy decision, as well as through legislative
changes. D. AARONSON, B. HOFF, P. JASZI, N. KrrTRIE & D. SAARI, THE NEW JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION

33-34, 63 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as THE NEW JUSTICE].

106. The federal government's program for desegregating the public schools in
the South presents a good example. After it became clearly illegal to segregate
school children by race, the numerous school officials who perpetuated this unlawful
behavior were engaged in criminal conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
Nonetheless, instead of resorting to criminal prosecutions, federal officials chose to
use a variety of nonpunitive means to achieve compliance with the law. The 1964
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000d-6 (1976), provided the statutory authority. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976), the Secretary of HEW withheld federal
aid to education funds from school districts which refused to desegregate. The Attorney General initiated civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976) to compel school
boards to develop and implement plans to desegregate. The Commissioner of Education provided technical assistance (including plan development) and special training
opportunities to school districts undergoing desegregation, as authorized by 42
U.S.C. § 2000L-2 to -4 (1976). During the period from about 1965 to 1971, these techniques were employed frequently and in a coordinated fashion to bring nearly all of
the 2,702 school districts in the eleven southern states into compliance with the federal desegregation standards. These efforts ended a great deal of illegal behavior
without imprisoning a single school official.
107. Cantor, supra note 98, at 107-12.
108. Id. at 113.
109. Id. at 108.
110. Id. at 108-11.
111. Id. at 111. The system of "composition" suggested by Cantor is similar to
a historical practice rediscovered recently by researchers in Europe. According to
Dr. Herman Bianchi, Director of the Criminological Institute at the Free University
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approval of an officiating judge or panel of arbitrators, to act or refrain from acting in specified ways, such as agreeing to make restitution or to perform personal services or to cease hazardous activity
(e.g., dumping dangerous chemicals into a river).
A variety of procedures designed to stop conflicts, resolve
disputes, or redress injuries without involving criminal courts
already are in use. Community courts, neighborhood justice cen2
ters, community complaint centers, and administrative tribunals"1
operate on a neighborhood level, at varying degrees of independence from formal criminal justice agencies. They rely principally on
mediation, whereby disputants arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution with minimal intervention by a third party, or on arbitration,
whereby the people in conflict give a neutral party authority to
render a binding decision after a full private hearing. 113
The Community Board Program, for example, operates in several neighborhoods in the San Francisco area. Volunteers from the
community are trained to listen to problems and conflicts and help
work out solutions. All participation is voluntary; the program has
no formal connection to the criminal justice system."14 In the
Night Prosecutor Program in Columbus, Ohio, citizen complainants and commercial bad-check cases are referred to trained law
student mediators who attempt to resolve conflicts through brief
administrative hearings."1 5 These programs generally deal with minor incidents involving family members, neighbors, and housing

managers and tenants, but their scope could be expanded considerably. 16
in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, there were only about 100 criminal trials a year in

Toulouse, France, during the 17th and 18th centuries, although it was a city of about
60,000 inhabitants and the jurisdiction of the courts extended into the countryside.

Crimelike conflicts--even acts of extreme violence-were not resolved by trials, but
by contracts entered into by the family of the offender and the family of the victim.

These contracts called for a variety of payments and services; one such contract, for
example, required an offender's family to find a husband for a rape victim. Researchers found thousands of these contracts in the archives of the civil notaries. Lecture
by Dr. Herman Bianchi, University of Baltimore (Dec. 7, 1978).
112. See generally THE NEW JUSTICE, supra note 105.
113. INSTEAD OF PRISONS, supra note 25, at 115.
114. Community Board Program, Annual Report 1-3 (Feb. 28, 1978) (on file in
office of the Hofstra Law Review).

115. See generally Citizen Dispute Settlement: The Columbus Night Prosecutor's Program (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA,
U.S. Dep't of Justice 1974).

116. See generally Hofrichter, Justice Centers Raise Basic Questions, 2 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 168, 168-72 (1977); INSTEAD OF PRISONS, supra

note 25, at 114-18. A Senate bill, S. 957, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which did not
pass in the 95th Congress, would have provided funds, technical assistance, and research money for local dispute resolution projects.
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Pretrial intervention or diversion programs have been established throughout the country in recent years. These programs involve deferring prosecution of defendants who are deemed likely to
benefit from treatment or services or whose offenses are seen as
being of little consequence. These programs not only serve to
lessen the strain on overburdened courts, but also offer defendants
treatment or training options and the possibility of avoiding further
criminal processing. Although there are procedural variations, the
programs generally operate by securing the agreement of defendants to abide by specified conditions over a prescribed period during which prosecution is suspended. If the defendant satisfies the
conditions--usually requiring freedom from arrests and participation in training, education, or counseling-the original charges are
117
dismissed.
There are also many means of avoiding incarceration after conviction. The commitment not to rely on imprisonment is as significant in itself as the existence of alternative programs. Holland, for
example, which has an imprisonment rate approximately one-tenth
that of the United States, 118 does not have a large array of alternatives to incarceration. Motivated by the strong belief that imprisonment should be used only as a last resort and then only in small
increments, Dutch sentencing practices rely heavily on fines, even
for serious offenses. In 1975, fines constituted 43.4% of all penalties imposed for serious offenses. 119 An additional 20.7% of the
penalties consisted of fines combined with suspended incarcerative
sentences. 120
117. See generally J. Mullen, The Dilemma of Diversion (1975) (monograph
prepared for National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA,
U.S. Dep't of Justice). This report contains a comprehensive bibliography of articles
and reports on pretrial diversion as well as detailed descriptions of programs
operating in Minneapolis (Project De Novo), Massachusetts (The Court Resource
Project), and Florida (The Dade County Pre-Trial Intervention Project). The report
also highlights many questions being raised about these programs.

118. See, e.g., Doleschal, Rate and Length of Imprisonment, 23 ClNIE & DELINQUENCY 51 (1977).

119.

How Holland Supports Its Low IncarcerationRate, Reachout, July 1978,

at 1, col. 2, 6, col. 2 (Newsletter of the Criminal Justice Team for the New York Conference, United Church of Christ). In 1975, only five percent of convicted federal defendants in the United States were sentenced with a fine only. In 1976, the figure
rose to eight percent, but one-half of these sentences were for traffic offenses and
migratory bird violations. See Table 5.22, Defendants Sentenced in U.S. District

Courts, by Offense and Type and Length of Sentence, Fiscal Year 1976, in 1977
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 59, at 552-53; Table 5.23, Defendants Disposed of in U.S.
District Courts, by Type of Disposition and Type and Length of Sentence, Fiscal
years 1945-75, in 1977 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 59, at 554-55.
120. How Holland Supports Its Low IncarcerationRate, Reachout, July 1978,
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Use of money fines as a criminal penalty could be expanded
considerably in the United States. Fines could be graded according to ability to pay; in addition, installment payments could be
permitted and other nonincarcerative penalties instituted if payment is not made. The Swedish "day fine" system offers a model
worth emulating. The theory underlying the day-fine system is that
"a monetary penalty should be equally burdensome for both rich
and poor."121 The amount of a fine is based on (1) the seriousness
of the offense and (2) the offender's financial resources.' 22 Offense
severity is ranked on a scale of "day fines" from 1 to 120.123 The
offender's financial worth is reduced to a per diem income, gener24
ally formulated at one-tenth of one percent of annual income.'
For example, drunk driving might be assigned a value of 50 "day
fines." An offender earning $20,000, would have a per diem figure
of $20. Thus, the penalty set for this offender would be 50
multiplied by $20 or $1000. For an offender who earned $10,000
annually, the penalty would be half as much.
Although imprisonment for unpaid fines is possible in Sweden,
strenuous efforts are made to avoid it. By considering ability to
pay, allowing extensions of time and installment payments, and
enforcing payment, the number of persons actually imprisoned for
nonpayment is kept between 100 and 200 persons per year. Given
that about 250,000 persons are punished with fines each year, non25
incarcerative methods of enforcement clearly predominate.1
In some instances, the fruits of fines assessed against individual or corporate offenders may be passed on, directly or indirectly,
to crime victims. Some states provide direct compensation to vicat 1, col. 2, 6, col. 2. (Newsletter of the Criminal Justice Team for the New York

Conference, United Church of Christ). Another reflection of the importance of policy
decisions lies in the Dutch phenomenon of "walking convicts." Rather than accept

offenders beyond the population capacities of the prisons, the Dutch simply let convicted offenders remain at large in the community until beds become available for
them. This practice can lead to a large backlog of persons waiting to serve their
prison sentences: In 1975, 14,000 people had been sentenced to prison, but were not
yet admitted. Id. At the request of the Minister of Justice, the Queen granted a blanket amnesty of 14 days, an act that reduced the backlog to 8000, since 6000 walking
convicts had 14 days or less to serve. The average prison sentence in Holland is 35

days. Only four percent of prison sentences are for terms longer than a year. Id. at 7.
121. Newton, Alternatives to Imprisonment: Day Fines, Community Service
Orders, and Restitution, 8 CRiME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE 109, 112 (1976).
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 112-13. The Swedish formula also makes adjustments for the offender's dependents and the amount of property he or she owns. Id. at 113-14.
125. Id. at 114.
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tirs of crimes. 126 In addition, a number of jurisdictions have form-

alized programs to assist offenders in making restitution.12 7 An
adult restitution program in Georgia, for example, was designed to

provide an alternative penalty for felony offenders who otherwise
would be sentenced to the state's overcrowded prisons. One part of

the program is residential; converted motel and similar facilities are
used as community restitution centers where offenders convicted of
serious offenses are required to reside during the initial phase of

their restitution participation. Other components are combined
with probation or parole and are nonresidential. Participating of-

fenders are assisted in finding employment and their earnings are
distributed so as to gradually help repay victims. 128
Another form of penalty involves requiring offenders to pro-

vide service to the victim or, symbolically, to the community to
help mend the damage caused. Within the last decade, some
courts here and abroad have begun to use community service sentences on a regular basis. California alone now has more than fifty

programs designed to place offenders in nonpaid positions with
nonprofit or tax-supported agencies to perform fixed quantities of
work or service as a sentencing option or condition. 1 2 9 Typical

tasks performed include planting trees and shrubbery, stuffing envelopes, helping the elderly or disabled, assisting in hospital wards
and kitchens, and tutoring.
126. Since 1965, at least one-third of the states have adopted programs whereby
the state will compensate victims of certain crimes for losses not covered by insurance. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-.180 (Gum. Supp. 1972); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
13959-13969.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9001-9017 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
70, § 71-84 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 346.010-.180 (Supp.
1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, §§ 1-17 (1957 & Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 258A, §§ 1-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 18.351-.368 (Cum. Supp. 1978-79); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 299B.01-.16 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); NEV. BEV. STAT. §§ 217.010-.350 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-1 to
-21 (West Supp. 1978-79); N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 620-635 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1972-78); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743:51-:72 (Anderson Supp. 1977); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 147.005-.365 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.010-.910 (Supp. 1977);
WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 949.01-.18 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
127.

See, e.g., OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION passim (B.

Galaway &.J. Hudson eds. 1978); Newton, Aid to the Victim (pt. 1), 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE 368, 380-89 (1976).
128. B. Read, Offender Restitution Programs in Georgia (unpublished paper on
file with the authors).
129. See, e.g., M.K. Harris, Community Service by Offenders (forthcoming from
National Council on Crime and Delinquency under contract to American Bar Association); J. Beha, K. Carlson & R. Rosenblum, Sentencing to Community Service (Oct.
1977) (report prepared for National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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The British turned to community service sentences specifically
as a means of reducing prison crowding. This penalty now is employed throughout the United Kingdom. The offenders involved
have been convicted of felonies for which they could have been incarcerated. Furthermore, approximately ninety percent of the participants have had prior convictions and about half previously have
130
served a custodial sentence.
The alternatives to incarceration discussed here are only those
that are relatively well developed. They have been developed with
primary focus on offenders involved in street crimes, although
many of them, such as composition and community service, may
be quite suitable for dealing with organizational crime as well. If
prisons were outlawed, an even broader array of sanctioning and
resolution options would, in all likelihood, be devised.
In reevaluating how best to respond to crime, the focus of
concern should be shifted from the present preoccupation with society's right to retaliate against the offender with disabling force.
Crime places stress on the fabric of the social structure; retaliation
only serves to widen the gap between the offender and the community. Because crime undermines our confidence that the moral
values of the culture can bind us together for mutual protection
and well-being, society should respond to it in ways that tend to
rebuild that confidence and reinforce our fundamental values. To
best serve the interests of society, the interests of each of its members must be considered, including those of victims and offenders,
as well as those of the broader community.
Society's interests will be served well by efforts to restore
victims to their precrime condition, the damage having been repaired; to restore offenders to full status in the community, the
slate having been cleaned; and to restore social harmony, the
values necessary or important to society having been honored. The
actions taken in response to crime should express the community's
disapproval, and should encompass holding the offender responsible for his or her actions. Where feasible, involvement of the offender in righting the wrong is especially appropriate. This not
only helps the victim, but also permits the offender to regain full
integrity and status in the community. 131
130. See Inner London Probation and After-Care Service, Another Step in the
Right Direction 8 (1976) (Fourth Annual Report); K. Pease, P. Durkin, I. Earnshaw,
D. Payne & J. Thorpe, Community Service Orders 40-41 (Home Offic- Research
Study No. 29, 1975).
131. Professor Bianchi points out that resolving crimes by contract has the ben-
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In many cases, the offender will not be able to fully repair the
damage. Being a victim of crime often includes suffering and other
intangible effects that are difficult to redress. Offenders whose
earning power is low or whose offenses are very severe will be unlikely to make full monetary restitution. It will be difficult to determine appropriate forms of compensation for crimes like price-fixing
and polluting where harm is spread widely. Nonetheless, aiming
toward restoring the victim is constructive and can help to restore
social harmony.
As noted above, this Article does not attempt to present a
fully developed formulation of the interests that society should try
to serve in deciding how to respond to crime. Rather, the aim is to
effectuate a shift in the sentencing debate away from the current
focus on stale questions surrounding street crime and imprisonment-such as fixed versus indefinite terms or mandatory versus
advisory guidelines on length of termla 2-- to a variety of delicate
and novel issues associated with abandoning imprisonment. It
would be folly to assume that all nonincarcerative penalties will be
free from objectionable features. Undoubtedly, some suggested
penalties will be unduly intrusive, inconsistent with individual dignity and privacy, or otherwise undesirable. However, articulating
goals and principles to guide development of nonincarcerative sanctions, plus early delineation of the criteria by which new penalties
will be evaluated, could help in avoiding many potential pitfalls.
The following questions illustrate the types of concerns that need
to be explored:
How can we prevent application of new, attractive, nonincarcerative sanctions to offenders who otherwise would have been
dealt with less severely?
To what extent can we rely on the civil courts instead of the
criminal justice system?
efit of making the offender a "debtor" instead of a "criminal." Within the limits of
economic opportunities, it is in the offender's control to discharge the debt and
achieve a restoration of status. Lecture by Dr. Herman Bianchi, University of
Baltimore (Dec. 7, 1978).
132. See 1977 Hearings,supra note 86, 8575-9895 (sentencing and general codification). Although the criminal code bill continues to be touted as a sentencing reform, the voluminous testimony deals almost exclusively with penalties of incarceration. In addition, that full implementation of the allowed penalties would be likely
to yield massive increases in human confinement at the federal level was neither
raised nor challenged by many of those who testified, including some persons who
have on other occasions strongly criticized America's over-reliance on incarceration.
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What alternatives to confinement will be satisfactory for dealing with persons who have committed violent acts?
How can public attitudes and public policies be attuned to the
realities of the harm done by corporate and organizational
crime?
What mechanisms should we establish for compensating victims of crime in cases where the offender is unable to make
full restitution or is never found?
Where the obligation to make restitution exceeds the offender's ability to pay, should we forgive some portion of the debt,
require the offender to perform community service work, or
impose other penalties?
How can we measure the extent of the injury and compensate
the victims (the public) in corruption cases, such as bribery or
vote fraud?
What sorts of sanctions should be imposed on offenders who
fail to comply with the terms of nonincarcerative sentences?
What are the fundamental features, if any, that distinguish one
form of behavioral control, such as imprisonment, from residential and nonresidential alternatives, such as probation, supervision, curfews, or halfway house residence?
How can sentencing disparity be avoided with penalties
geared to the needs of victims?
Is it inevitable that the racial and class discrimination so characteristic of our confinement policies will be maintained as
new practices are adopted?
Serious exploration of these and other questions will require a
great deal of time, soul searching, and imagination. The process of
full debate in this arena should be delayed no longer.
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